Provenance record

Risk and Refusal: Mechanisms of LLM Responses to Suicidal Ideation

arXiv cs.CY (Computers and Society) (tier 1, academic) 2026-10-19T04:00:00.000Z Original ↗

Source note: Preprints on societal impact.


Discourse valence
-43
Adverse
confidence 82% · 5 items · range -100 to +15
Adverse readingFavourable reading
Consensus of 5 models from different labs. Spread 115 points, agreement low.
Existential and catastrophic riskLoss of control and alignmentMedicine and health
Excerpt as ingested

arXiv:2610.22715v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Refusal is a common safety mechanism in large language models (LLMs), yet in contexts of suicidal ideation (SI), refusing to engage can itself constitute a safety failure. We evaluate how eight instruction-tuned LLMs respond to SI and self-harm disclosures across three datasets, varying whether models are informed that a disclosure expresses SI and whether they receive a clinician-developed response protocol, and complement this with mechanistic analyses in six open-weight models. Our results reveal a nuanced relationship between refusal and response-level risk. At baseline, elevated risk in model responses is driven primarily by inattention to the disclosure, alongside refusal to engage. Mechanistic analyses suggest that models may refuse SI disclosures through the same direction that mediates their refusals of harmful requests. However, informing models of the SI context, or suppressing refusal directly, increases engagement without reliably lowering response risk, and may raise it. In contrast, the clinician-guided protocol consistently reduces response-level risk while also reducing refusal. Together, these analyses and ablations motivate the need for models that refuse only when warranted and engage in interactionally safe ways when users disclose SI.

Every model that read this

ModelProviderStageScoreConf.LatencyPromptWhen
Llama 3.3 70BMetaanalysis -50 80%4438ms v1.0.0 / m1.0.1 2026-10-19 05:41
GPT-4.1 miniOpenAIconsensus +15 80%2877ms v1.0.0 / m1.0.1 2026-10-19 05:42
Claude Sonnet 5Anthropicconsensus -15 70%10491ms v1.0.0 / m1.0.1 2026-10-19 05:42
Gemini 2.5 FlashGoogleconsensus -100 90%2368ms v1.0.0 / m1.0.1 2026-10-19 05:42
Mistral Small 3.1 24BMistral AIconsensus -65 90%6611ms v1.0.0 / m1.0.1 2026-10-19 05:42
Llama 3.3 70B · reading

LLMs may refuse suicidal ideation disclosures, increasing risk. Informed models or suppressed refusal may raise risk.

evidence: primary horizon: n/a
GPT-4.1 mini · reading

The study identifies that refusing to engage with suicidal ideation disclosures by LLMs can itself be harmful, suggesting current refusal mechanisms may fail in these contexts. However, clinician-guided protocols show promise in reducing risk and refusal, indicating potential for safer engagement. The implications are mixed due to risks of harmful responses and opportunities for improved interventions.

evidence: primary horizon: near capability 50 societal 30 existential 5 economic 10
Claude Sonnet 5 · reading

This is a rigorous academic study showing current LLM refusal behavior can worsen outcomes for suicidal users, a concerning finding about deployed systems. However, it also identifies a working mitigation (clinician-guided protocols), making the overall implication mixed rather than purely negative.

evidence: reported horizon: n/a
Gemini 2.5 Flash · reading

LLMs at baseline exhibit risky behavior when responding to suicidal ideation, either by refusing to engage or by providing unhelpful responses. Attempts to increase engagement without specific protocols increase risk. This highlights a significant safety failure with potentially severe consequences for human well-being.

evidence: reported horizon: n/a
Mistral Small 3.1 24B · reading

The study shows that current LLM safety mechanisms can fail in contexts of suicidal ideation. While there are ways to improve model responses, the baseline risks are concerning.

evidence: primary horizon: n/a existential 0

Evidence extracted

The chain
SOURCE     arXiv cs.CY (Computers and Society) (tier 1)
   ↓
DOCUMENT   74a49f72-5a37-47c5-92d7-865597bee500
           https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22715
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EVIDENCE   3 extracted excerpts
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MODEL RUN  5 runs, methodology 1.0.1
   ↓
SCORE      -43  (Adverse)
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CONFIDENCE 82%